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Iran “Activates” Special Mode: A Worrying Signal for the U.S. and Israel?

Iran “Activates” Special Mode: A Worrying Signal for the U.S. and Israel?

Officials at the Pentagon say Iran’s retaliatory attacks have dropped sharply, with missile launches down 90% and UAV deployments falling 83% compared to the early phase of the conflict.

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Range of several Iranian missiles (Photo: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Bloomberg reported that the shift reflects lessons learned by the U.S. military from last summer’s confrontation with Iran. U.S. and Israeli commanders identified missile launchers as a key vulnerability, shifting strategy toward destroying launch platforms, underground silos, and command centers rather than relying solely on air defense interception.

At first glance, the data appears to support that view. On the first day of fighting (Feb. 28), Iran launched 309 missiles, followed by 584 on day two. But from March 9 to 17, the number dropped to an average of just 30 missiles per day.

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Chart showing the number of weapons launched by Iran at the UAE as of March 17. Blue bars represent missiles, while yellow bars indicate UAVs (Photo: ISW).


Iran “Activating” a Special Mode?

Retired U.S. Army Col. Douglas MacGregor, a former Pentagon adviser during the first administration of Donald Trump, offered a different perspective.

He suggested the decline may partly reflect missile depletion—but not entirely. Iran may also be running out of high-value U.S. targets after damaging infrastructure, command-and-control systems, radar installations, and air defense batteries such as Patriot and THAAD across the region.

Questions about Iran’s missile and UAV stockpiles have become a major concern for U.S. and Israeli intelligence, though Tehran keeps such information tightly guarded.

According to The Guardian, Iran rejected two ceasefire messages from Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff, as its leadership believes it is not losing the war and that the White House is under growing political pressure.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi added that unilateral claims of victory by Trump would not end the conflict—suggesting Tehran may be prepared to continue hostilities in some form, including tightening control over commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran launches a massive wave of missile strikes in retaliation for the killing of senior leaders and top commanders (Photo: ISW).


A War of Attrition

An analysis by Center for Strategic and International Studies, cited by Military Watch Magazine, describes the conflict as “a race to see who runs out of ammunition first.”

Analyst Mark Cancian argues that Iran’s offensive missile stockpile may far exceed the interceptor inventories of the U.S. and its allies.

In fact, the U.S. entered the conflict with already strained air defense reserves. By early 2025, the Pentagon reportedly had around 600 THAAD interceptors remaining—each costing about $12.6 million—with more than 150 used in just 12 days of fighting with Iran in June 2025.

Supplies for Patriot systems had also dropped to roughly 25% of required levels by mid-2025, according to Pentagon assessments.

Sources cited by CBS News said that while Washington is aware of severe interceptor shortages among Gulf allies, little has been done to address the issue.

Meanwhile, Middle East Eye reported that the U.S. declined requests from some Gulf states for additional weapons and ammunition—potentially reflecting shortages and a prioritization of defending U.S. and Israeli positions.


Why Isn’t Iran Escalating?

Given these conditions, Iran could theoretically strike U.S. bases and interests across the Middle East with fewer constraints. So why hasn’t it intensified attacks?

One possible explanation: Tehran may have “activated” a form of strategic restraint—conserving missiles for a longer war.


How Large Is Iran’s Arsenal?

Russian analysts estimate Iran possesses at least 5,000 missiles of various types. Tehran appears to be using them selectively:

  • Short-range targets (250–350 km) such as U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain: Fateh-110 and Fateh-313—light, mobile, and highly accurate.

  • Medium-range targets (~600 km) in Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia: Zolfaghar (700 km range) and Qiyam-1 (800 km).

  • Long-range strikes (1,200–1,600 km) against Israel: Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missiles with a 2,000 km range and heavy payloads, capable of evading air defenses in the terminal phase.

  • Iran is the only country in the region with a fully domestic precision-guided missile production chain. It is believed to be producing around 100 ballistic missiles per month, with much of its manufacturing hidden in underground facilities operating around the clock.


    The Bigger Question

    In this asymmetric war, the central question remains:

    Who will run out first—the United States and its allies, or Iran?

    Report: Iran Was Nearing Nuclear Capabilities While Negotiating ‘Peace’
    Report: Iran Was Nearing Nuclear Capabilities While Negotiating ‘Peace’ Oman’s foreign minister said Feb. 27 that negotiations with Iran had produced a potential breakthrough on the country’s nuclear program, even as the Islamic Republic was continuing to secretly advance its nuclear weapons program. Speaking during an interview on CBS in Washington, the minister said Iranian officials had agreed in principle to eliminate their stockpile of enriched uranium, permit full monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and convert existing nuclear material into reactor fuel. According to the minister, the proposal would involve irreversible steps to prevent the material from being used for weapons purposes while allowing international inspectors to verify compliance. “This is something completely new,” he said. “If you cannot stockpile material that is enriched, then there is no way you can actually create a bomb.” On the same day that Oman announced a reported breakthrough in nuclear negotiations with Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulated a confidential report raising concerns about undeclared nuclear material, Vision Times reported. The agency said it was unable to verify the exact size, composition, or precise location of the material. Inspectors also reported what they described as a “loss of continuity of knowledge” regarding Iran’s nuclear inventory, indicating that monitoring gaps had prevented the agency from maintaining a complete record of the material’s status. Analysts reviewing intelligence reports, satellite imagery and international monitoring data say evidence suggests Iran continued advancing aspects of its nuclear program while diplomatic negotiations were underway. According to the assessments, Tehran allegedly concealed portions of its nuclear activities from international inspectors while expanding construction of hardened facilities tied to the program. The developments were reported to have occurred during the months preceding military strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in early 2026, the outlet reported. Four strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign highlight both allies’ determination to eliminate Iran’s remaining pathways to nuclear weapons, said a separate report. The attacks, which appear to be carried out by Israel, targeted several locations: a covert nuclear weapons development site known as Minzadehei; entrances to enrichment facilities at Natanz; structures within the nuclear complex at Isfahan; and a laboratory in the Lavisan 2/Mojdeh complex that houses facilities operated by Iran’s nuclear weapons program’s administrative arm, SPND, the separate report added. Diplomatic discussions in late February focused on a proposed framework that would significantly restrict Iran’s nuclear program, according to officials familiar with the talks, Vision Times noted. Under the proposal, Iran would stop accumulating enriched uranium, permit comprehensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and convert existing nuclear material into reactor fuel. The measures were intended to limit Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade material while allowing for international oversight. However, a confidential IAEA report circulated around the same time raised questions about whether such commitments could be effectively verified. Agency inspectors had already warned of a “loss of continuity of knowledge” regarding Iran’s nuclear materials after access to key facilities had been restricted for several months, said the outlet. The report said Iran had concealed a stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity in an underground tunnel complex at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. Because inspectors lacked access to several enrichment sites, the IAEA said it could not confirm the full size, composition, or precise location of Iran’s nuclear stockpile. Military strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure began the following day, Vision Times added. For years, international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program focused on whether Tehran would enrich uranium to 90 percent purity, the level widely considered weapons-grade. However, some researchers have suggested that lower enrichment levels could still pose proliferation risks. In July 2025, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published research indicating that 60 percent-enriched uranium could be used in crude nuclear devices without additional enrichment. A separate study by physicists at Illinois State University estimated that approximately 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent could produce a device with an explosive yield of about one kiloton, said Vision Times.