Speaking during an interview on CBS in Washington, the minister said Iranian officials had agreed in principle to eliminate their stockpile of enriched uranium, permit full monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and convert existing nuclear material into reactor fuel.

According to the minister, the proposal would involve irreversible steps to prevent the material from being used for weapons purposes while allowing international inspectors to verify compliance.

“This is something completely new,” he said. “If you cannot stockpile material that is enriched, then there is no way you can actually create a bomb.”

On the same day that Oman announced a reported breakthrough in nuclear negotiations with Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulated a confidential report raising concerns about undeclared nuclear material, Vision Times reported.

The agency said it was unable to verify the exact size, composition, or precise location of the material. Inspectors also reported what they described as a “loss of continuity of knowledge” regarding Iran’s nuclear inventory, indicating that monitoring gaps had prevented the agency from maintaining a complete record of the material’s status.

Analysts reviewing intelligence reports, satellite imagery and international monitoring data say evidence suggests Iran continued advancing aspects of its nuclear program while diplomatic negotiations were underway.

According to the assessments, Tehran allegedly concealed portions of its nuclear activities from international inspectors while expanding construction of hardened facilities tied to the program. The developments were reported to have occurred during the months preceding military strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in early 2026, the outlet reported.

Four strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign highlight both allies’ determination to eliminate Iran’s remaining pathways to nuclear weapons, said a separate report.

The attacks, which appear to be carried out by Israel, targeted several locations: a covert nuclear weapons development site known as Minzadehei; entrances to enrichment facilities at Natanz; structures within the nuclear complex at Isfahan; and a laboratory in the Lavisan 2/Mojdeh complex that houses facilities operated by Iran’s nuclear weapons program’s administrative arm, SPND, the separate report added.

Diplomatic discussions in late February focused on a proposed framework that would significantly restrict Iran’s nuclear program, according to officials familiar with the talks, Vision Times noted.

Under the proposal, Iran would stop accumulating enriched uranium, permit comprehensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and convert existing nuclear material into reactor fuel. The measures were intended to limit Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade material while allowing for international oversight.

However, a confidential IAEA report circulated around the same time raised questions about whether such commitments could be effectively verified. Agency inspectors had already warned of a “loss of continuity of knowledge” regarding Iran’s nuclear materials after access to key facilities had been restricted for several months, said the outlet.

The report said Iran had concealed a stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity in an underground tunnel complex at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center.

Because inspectors lacked access to several enrichment sites, the IAEA said it could not confirm the full size, composition, or precise location of Iran’s nuclear stockpile.

Military strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure began the following day, Vision Times added.

For years, international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program focused on whether Tehran would enrich uranium to 90 percent purity, the level widely considered weapons-grade.

However, some researchers have suggested that lower enrichment levels could still pose proliferation risks. In July 2025, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published research indicating that 60 percent-enriched uranium could be used in crude nuclear devices without additional enrichment.

A separate study by physicists at Illinois State University estimated that approximately 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent could produce a device with an explosive yield of about one kiloton, said Vision Times.